这将是不同的：学会与中国力量共存

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t2396jbJjP0

新南威尔士皇家学会

2022年7月8日 

新南威尔士州立图书馆
新南威尔士皇家学会第 1304 届常务大会和公开讲座——2022 年 7 月 6 日

“这将是不同的：学会与中国力量共存”

名誉教授 Hugh White AO FASSA

澳大利亚国立大学战略研究名誉教授

摘要：自欧洲人定居以来，中国的崛起推动了澳大利亚国际环境发生最重大的转变。到目前为止，我们对此持否认态度，希望美国霸权的重新确立将遏制中国的力量并维护美国主导的旧地区秩序，该秩序对我们非常有利。但这些希望实现的可能性有多大，如果希望破灭了，我们该怎么办？在一个不再由我们的伟大而强大的朋友主宰的亚洲，澳大利亚将如何生存？我们如何回答这个问题将在很大程度上定义我们作为一个国家。

这将是不同的：学会与中国力量共存

https://www.royalsoc.org.au/images/pdf/journal/156-1-White.pdf

休·怀特

澳大利亚国立大学战略研究名誉教授
hugh.white@anu.edu.au

本文基于休·怀特于 2022 年 7 月 6 日在新南威尔士州立图书馆画廊室举行的第 1304 次常务大会和公开讲座上向皇家学会发表的演讲记录。

介绍

朱迪思·惠尔顿（RSNSW 副主席）：

“这将是不同的——学会与中国力量共存。”我们的演讲者是澳大利亚国立大学战略研究名誉教授 Hugh White AO FASSA。Hugh 的大部分职业生涯都在澳大利亚政府中度过。他曾担任总理鲍勃霍克的国际关系顾问以及战略和国防部副部长。在年轻时，他就是澳大利亚战略政策研究所的创始主任，并在 2004 年至 2011 年期间担任澳大利亚国立大学战略与国防研究中心主任。

他出版了许多著作，包括《权力转移：华盛顿和北京之间的澳大利亚未来》（2010 年）、《中国选择：美国为何应该分享权力》（2012 年）、《没有美国，澳大利亚在新亚洲的未来》（2017 年）和《如何保卫澳大利亚》（2019 年）。

我认为，从这些书名和以前的立场中，我们可以一窥一些有趣的观点、挑战和争议。所有这些都受到休在 20 世纪 70 年代在墨尔本大学和牛津大学学习哲学的影响。

但从中国正在崛起，以及这正在改变世界各国之间的关系并挑战我们对中国和其他国家的态度这一观点来看，休认为中美关系将发生变化，美国人否认他们在世界上应有的角色正在造成巨大困难。

那么，在一个不再由我们伟大而强大的朋友主宰的亚洲，澳大利亚将如何生存？休斯认为，我们如何回答这个问题将在很大程度上定义我们作为一个国家。

因为那是在 2022 年中期写的，也许会有一两句新话。普京是如何改变这种演算的，最近的澳大利亚大选又是如何改变这种演算的？如果需要的话，将有一个问答环节来增加趣味。会议将由名誉教授克里斯蒂娜·斯莱德主持，她从牛津大学时期就与休·怀特长期对话。克里斯蒂娜是学会计划委员会主席，正是这个委员会为我们带来了这次活动。准备好您的问题，以便进行问答。休，一切都由您来回答。

一个巨大的新挑战

休·怀特：非常感谢朱迪思的欢迎和介绍，也感谢克里斯蒂的邀请。

感谢大家的到来。我很荣幸能来到这里。这真是一件了不起的事情

这是北约的一次规模空前的会议，包括我们在内的四个亚太国家参加了会议，北约在会上做了一件非常重要的事情。它宣布中国是对北约安全的“挑战”。

因此，我们在澳大利亚看到的与中国有关的情况与欧洲的情况类似，这也与2022年2月俄罗斯入侵以来的乌克兰危机产生了共鸣。这场危机增加、放大并加剧了我们这个地区对正在发生的事情的所有焦虑。

我想做的是探索这个问题，解开它，对正在发生的事情做出解释，并讨论我们如何解决这个问题，以及从另一个角度来看会发生什么我认为，理解正在发生的大事的最好方式是将其视为对全球秩序的挑战。我所说的全球秩序并不是什么宏大的东西，我只是指一套假设、期望和规则——有时是非正式的规则——它们构成了各国相处的方式。
很难用更精确的术语来定义它，但它是非常真实的事情。国际关系不是凭空而来的。它们发生在一系列期望中，就像所有人际关系一样，全球秩序就是一套期望和假设，它们构成了各国相处的方式。

我们一生中最引人注目的发展之一是冷战时期两极秩序的崩溃，冷战时期两极秩序出现于20世纪40年代末，当时美国和苏联之间存在结构性竞争，并构成了世界各地的国家关系。苏联解体后，这一秩序被美国主导的单极秩序所取代。

至少对我们而言——我说的“我们”不仅仅指澳大利亚，而是指整个西方——这是一个非常快乐的时刻。我们相信，我们已经进入了一个新的全球秩序，该秩序基于我们社会所特有的价值观、理想和思想。

这一秩序似乎得到了美国朋友和盟友的广泛支持：在欧洲、北约、北约扩大后的整个欧洲，以及日本。可以说在印度（我稍后会谈到这一点）以及我们所谓的整个西方都得到了支持。但人们也强烈地期望，这一趋势将进一步扩大——一个单极全球秩序，美国是全球唯一的强国，在世界各地发挥决定性的战略影响力，并将推动自由民主政治制度和市场经济制度在世界范围内的出现。这就是弗朗西斯·福山 (1992) 谈论历史的终结时的意思。所有关于如何组织社会、如何将社会与经济联系起来等的争论似乎都因这一由美国主导的单极秩序的出现而得到了解决。

它承诺，除了支持我们作为一个社会共同发展、推广和信仰的价值观之外，它还承诺一个和平时代，因为没有我们所看到的意识形态之争，特别是在 20 世纪——见证了第一次世界大战、第二次世界大战、冷战——似乎有理由希望世界上所有主要大国都能和谐相处。这个想法是，因为他们都认同关于自己社会和国际社会组织的相同基本理念，所以他们没有特别的理由相互竞争。

This is going to be different: Learning to live with Chinese Power

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=t2396jbJjP0
Royal Society of NSW

2022年7月8日  STATE LIBRARY OF NEW SOUTH WALES
1304th Ordinary General Meeting and Open Lecture of the Royal Society of NSW — 6 July 2022

“This is going to be different: Learning to live with Chinese Power”

Emeritus Professor Hugh White AO FASSA

Emeritus Professor of Strategic Studies, Australian National University

Summary: China's rise drives the most consequential shift in Australia's international environment since European settlement. So far we are in denial about this, hoping that a reassertion of American supremacy will contain China's power and preserve the old US-led regional order which has served us so well. But what are the chances of those hopes being realised, and what can we do if they are dashed? How does Australia make its way in an Asia no longer dominated by our Great and Powerful Friends? How we answer that question will do much to define us as a nation.

This is going to be different: learning to live with Chinese power

Hugh White
https://www.royalsoc.org.au/images/pdf/journal/156-1-White.pdf

Professor Emeritus of Strategic Studies at the Australian National University
hugh.white@anu.edu.au

1 This paper is based on the transcript of a talk that Hugh White gave to the Royal Society on 6 July 2022, at the 1304th Ordinary General Meeting and Open Lecture, in the Gallery Room, State Library of NSW.

Introduction

Judith Wheeldon (Vice President, RSNSW):

“This is going to be different — learning to live with Chinese Power.” Our speaker is
Professor Hugh White AO FASSA, Professor Emeritus of Strategic Studies at the
Australian National University. Hugh spent much of his career in the Australian government. He was international relations advisor to Prime Minister Bob Hawke and Deputy
Secretary for Strategy and the Department of Defence. As quite a young man, he was the
founding director of Australian Strategic Policy Institute, and, from 2004 to 2011, he
was head of the ANU Strategic and Defence Studies Centre. He has many publications,
including Power Shift: Australia’s Future between Washington and Beijing 2010, The
China Choice: Why America should Share Power 2012, Without America, Australia’s Future in the New Asia 2017, and How to Defend Australia 2019. I think we get a glimpse from those
book titles and previous positions of what some of the interesting points, challenges,
and controversies are going to be. All of it tempered by Hugh’s study in the 1970s of
philosophy at the Universities of Melbourne and Oxford.

But from the idea that China is rising, and that this is shifting relationships among
the countries of the world and challenging us about our attitudes to China as well as
to other countries, Hugh is suggesting that there will be changes in the relationships
between America and China, and that denial by Americans of their proper role
in the world is causing great difficulties.

So how does Australia make its way in an Asia no longer dominated by our great and
powerful friends? Hughes suggests that how we answer that question will do much to
define us as a nation.

Since that was written in mid-2022,maybe there’s a new sentence or two. How has Putin changed the calculus and how has the recent Australian election changed that calculus? There will be a Q & A to add spice, if any is needed. And it’s going to be led by
Emeritus Professor Christina Slade, a longstanding interlocutor of Hugh White from their Oxford days. Christina is the chair of the Society’s Programme Committee, which has brought us this event. Have your questions ready for the Q & A. Hugh, it’s all yours.

A great new challenge 

Hugh White: Well, thank you very much, Judith for that welcome and introduction, and thanks, Christie, for the invitation.
Thanks everyone for coming. It is an honour to be here. What a remarkable thing it is that 

It was an unprecedentedly large meeting of
NATO, joined by four countries from the
Asia Pacific including ourselves, in which
NATO did something quite significant. It
declared that China was a “challenge” to
NATO’s security. So what we are seeing here
in Australia in relation to China is seen in
similar terms in Europe, and that resonates
too with the crisis in Ukraine since the Russian invasion in February 2022.
That crisis has added to, amplified, and
exacerbated all of the anxieties that we
have in our part of the world about what’s
going on. What I want to do is to explore
this, to unpack it, to offer an explanation
for what’s going on, and talk about how we
work through this and what comes out the
other side.
I think the best way to understand the
big thing that is happening is to see it as
a challenge to the global order. And by
global order, I don’t mean anything very
grand, I just mean the set of assumptions
and expectations and rules — sometimes
informal rules — which frame the way in
which countries get on with one another.
It’s a pretty hard thing to define in more
precise terms, but it’s a very real thing.
International relations don’t just happen
in a vacuum. They happen within a set of
expectations, like all human relationships,
and the global order is the set of expectations and assumptions which frame the way
in which states get on with one another. One
of the most dramatic developments in our
lifetimes was the collapse of the bipolar
order of the Cold War, which had emerged
in the late 1940s with a structural rivalry
between the US and the Soviet Union, and
framed national relations around the world.
After the Soviet Union collapsed, this order
was replaced by a US-led unipolar order.
This was, at least for us — and when I say
us, I don’t just mean Australia, but for the
West at large — a very happy moment. We
believed that we’d moved into a new global
order based on the values and ideals and
ideas which had characterised our societies.
It appeared to be very broadly supported
by America’s friends and allies: in Europe,
in NATO, and across Europe as NATO
enlarged, and in Japan. Arguably in India
(I’ll come back to that) and in the whole
gamut of what we call the West. But it was
also a very strong expectation that it was
going to spread beyond that — that a unipolar global order, in which the United States
was the sole global power and exercised
decisive strategic influence everywhere,
and would promote the emergence of liberal
democratic political systems and market
economic systems around the world.
This was what Francis Fukuyama (1992)
meant when he talked about the end of
history. All of the debates about how to
organise society and how to relate society
to economics and so on appeared to be
resolved by the emergence of this unipolar,
US-led order. It promised, amongst other
things, not just support for the values that
we collectively as societies had developed
and had promoted and believed in. It also
promised an era of peace because, without
the ideological contestation that we’d seen,
particularly in the 20th century — witness
the First World War, the Second World
War, the Cold War — there seemed reason
to hope that all the world’s major powers
would live together harmoniously. The
idea was that because they all subscribed
to the same basic ideas about the organisation both of their own societies and of
the international community, they would
find no particular reason to compete with