We are returning to a world of great-power rivalry

The US unipolar era lasted less than 25 years, undone by war and financial crisis

by: John Sawers  OCTOBER 19, 2016 

The first foreign policy priority of the next American president will be to work out how to avoid direct conflict with China or Russia. Both countries, in different ways, now challenge US dominance. War between the great powers is once again a possibility. For better or worse, we are returning to a world of great power balance.

China’s economy is now, in purchasing power terms, comparable to America’s. Its military has invested in the means to counter US power and is exercising it in the East and South China Seas. President Xi Jinping has cast aside Deng Xiaoping’s “hide and bide” strategy and demands weight and influence commensurate with China’s power. In doing so, he is rubbing up against the US and its east Asian allies.

Since 2000, Russia has put the proceeds of a high oil price into military modernisation. Economically, it is not a great power. But it has a full spectrum of military capability to ensure its own security and rebuild a sphere of influence beyond its borders. Russia has gained from being assertive, in Ukraine and Syria and in the cyber domain, whetting President Vladimir Putin’s appetite for challenging America. The “post-truth world” in the west — exemplified by Donald Trump’s casual way with the facts in the US presidential campaign — is also a gift to Russia’s formidable propaganda machine.

The US unipolar era lasted less than 25 years, its end hastened by overambitious wars and the financial crisis of 2007-08. America remains by far the most powerful country, with unrivalled technology and corporate power but it no longer has global hegemony. The west’s economic dominance has declined sharply — the Group of Seven leading nations used to contribute 70 per cent of global gross domestic product; it is now down to 47 per cent and falling.

Nor does the western democratic model have the same appeal. Power concentrated in charismatic individuals rather than in institutions, as we see in Turkey, Russia and India, is proving more compelling for many.

Russia would like to return to a world of spheres of influence, with three great powers forming a global security directorate, while China wants a two-power world. Beijing is prepared to have Moscow as a junior partner but not as an equal. The Chinese leadership does not want confrontation with the US but finds it hard to see a way to a co-operative great power relationship.

America, meanwhile, wants to preserve its dominance and not to have to adjust to the new power distribution. It has tried “resets” with Russia, and has worked hard at an economic relationship with China. But the result has been a see-saw between warmer engagement followed by frostiness and sanctions. There is no hard-nosed strategic framework that governs Washington’s relations with either Moscow or Beijing.

An approach is needed that puts global stability first. Strong defence is essential. Washington’s defence investments were diverted for too long by the demands of the “war on terror”; they have only recently focused on the need to match Russia and China. That does not mean a return to cold war-style hostility. The 19th-century Concert of Europe, in which six powers preserved an equilibrium that lasted nearly 100 years, might be a better parallel.

What that requires is acceptance of each other’s systems of government, however much we may dislike them, and clear limits to hostile action to which all adhere. Cyber is a crucial theatre, where rules have to be agreed so that we do not threaten to bring down each other’s power grids or banking systems.

Co-operative solutions to regional problems would be more achievable if the great powers were not directly undermining one another. For example, North Korea will soon be able to threaten the mainland US with nuclear weapons. An enduring solution requires a change of regime in Pyongyang and the removal of its nuclear arsenal. The US can either use force to achieve that unilaterally and risk conflict with China, or it could seek to remove the threat in ways that Beijing can accept.

One great asset the US enjoys is a network of alliances. This needs more careful nurturing. The US and Europe spend too much time on an economic rivalry that damages both. A US partnership with India is also achievable as the latter’s interests are more closely aligned with the west’s than Russia’s or China’s.

Putting great power relations first will be unwelcome to many. Some will see it as an accommodation with unacceptable behaviour by undemocratic regimes but we have to treat the world as it is, not as we would like it to be. We cannot afford to stumble into a military conflict between the great powers.

The writer is chairman of Macro Advisory Partners and a former chief of MI6, the British Secret Intelligence Service.

   英前高官：中国要建立一个“两强世界”

                   2016-10-26 04:35 PM

        http://www.66.ca/portal.php?mod=view&aid=83657

10月25日，英国军情六处（全称为“英国陆军情报六局”，又称“英国秘密情报局”，是英国最重要的情报机关——观察者网注）前局长约翰·索沃斯在《金融时报》上发表文章《大国竞争时代回来了》。作者认为，“美国下届总统在外交政策方面第一个要解决的问题是如何避免与中国和俄罗斯爆发正面冲突”，西方必须“根据世界原本的样子、而不是按照我们希望它变成的样子，实事求是地对待这个世界”，因为西方“承受不起大国之间发生军事冲突的后果”。观察者网特转载该文如下：

　　2015年9月25日，美国华盛顿，习近平与奥巴马共同走向白宫椭圆形办公室（图片来源：央广网）

　　美国下届总统在外交政策方面第一个要解决的问题是如何避免与中国和俄罗斯爆发正面冲突。中俄两国都在挑战美国的主导地位，只是方式不同。大国之间爆发战争的可能性再度出现。不管是好是坏，我们正回到一个大国均势的世界。

　　以购买力计算，中国经济可与美国媲美。中国军队一直投入资金发展对抗美国实力的手段，并在东中国海和南中国海演练这种能力。中国国家主席习近平已放弃邓小平的“韬光养晦”战略，要求获得与中国实力相称的影响力。在此过程中，他正与美国及其亚洲盟友产生摩擦。

　　美国单极时代持续了不到25年，野心过大的战争以及2007年至2008年的金融危机加速了这个时代的结束。美国仍是全球最强大的国家，其科技力量及其企业的实力都是其他国家无法匹敌的，但它不再是一个全球霸权。西方的经济主导地位急剧下滑，七国集团曾占全球GDP总额的70%，如今这一比例已降至47%，而且还在不断下滑。

　　西方民主模式的吸引力也不同以往了。事实证明，对于很多人而言，权力集中在魅力超凡的个人而非机构的身上更让人信服，我们在土耳其、俄罗斯和印度都看到了这一点。

　　俄罗斯希望回到大国划定势力范围的年代，由美、中、俄三个大国组成全球安全委员会，而中国则希望建立一个“两强世界”。中国有意让俄罗斯成为小伙伴，而不是一个平等的伙伴。中国领导层不希望与美国对抗，但认为很难找到一种建立大国合作关系的途径。与此同时，美国希望维持其主导地位，而不必去适应新的权力分配。美国尝试过“重置”与俄罗斯的关系，也努力与中国发展经济关系。但结果却导致彼此关系在两种状态之间摇摆，有时候是较友好地进行接触之后又降至冰点，有时候是一方对另一方实施制裁。在处理与俄罗斯和中国的关系方面，华盛顿缺乏理性务实的战略框架。

　　我们需要制定一个策略，在这个策略中要把全球稳定放在第一位。强大的防御必不可少。太长时间以来，“反恐战争”的需要分散了美国的国防开支；最近美国的国防开支才着重于与俄罗斯和中国匹敌的需要。这并不意味着回归冷战风格的敌对关系。拿19世纪的“欧洲协同体”（Concert of Europe）作比可能更合适，当时6个欧洲强国维持了近100年的势力均衡。

　　这需要彼此之间接受对方的政府体制（不管我们多不喜欢），对敌对行动要有明确的限制，各方都要遵守。网络是一个重要领域，必须协商制定规则，这样我们才不至于威胁搞垮对方的电网或银行体系。

　　如果强国之间不直接对抗，那么合作解决地区问题将更容易实现。例如，朝鲜将很快有能力利用核武器威胁美国本土。长远的解决方案是让朝鲜政权更迭并消灭其核武库。美国要么利用武力单方面实现这点并冒着与中国发生冲突的风险，要么寻求以中国能够接受的方式消除这种威胁。

　　美国的一项重要资产是同盟体系。这需要更为精心的培育。美国和欧洲把太多时间花费在经济竞争上，让彼此都受损。美国与印度的合作也是可以实现的，因为比起印俄或印中关系，印度与西方之间的利益更为一致。

　　把大国关系置于首位会引起许多人的反感。一些人会认为这是迁就非民主政权不可接受的行为，但我们必须根据世界原本的样子、而不是按照我们希望它变成的样子，实事求是地对待这个世界。我们承受不起大国之间发生军事冲突的后果。

　　本文作者现任宏观顾问机构（Macro Advisory Partners）主席，曾担任英国秘密情报局（British Secret Intelligence Service）亦称“军情六处”局长。