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Want to lead in the Pacific? Try listening first | Opinion | dailypost.vu
Should Pacific Island Nations Be Wary of Chinese Influence?
Hua Chunying's article on Pacific island countries is too sharp
Western
countries want to fend off Chinese influence in the Pacific
Australia lashes out at China's 'useless' Pacific projects | Financial Time
The average Australian’s conception of Pacific island nations is so limited it makes some of us wonder if they even want to understand. Our voices—and our reality—have been pointedly and repeatedly ignored in the media, and in the corridors of power.
An Australian news service breathlessly proclaims Chinese plans to build a military base only a short flight away from Brisbane, and the Canberra commentariat has kittens.
Vanuatu insiders say ‘it was never in the cards’.
‘Yes, but it was discussed!’ insist defence analysts.
‘A base was never discussed and it would never happen,’ says Vanuatu’s Foreign Minister.
‘Yes, but a Chinese military presence is in the works!’ insist the same analysts.
‘Vanuatu would never agree to this and anyone who says otherwise is indulging in malicious speculation,’ says Vanuatu’s Prime Minister.
‘Here’s the wharf where it’s going to happen!’ announce Australian media, and a chorus of cold-warriors claim that Australia is forsaking its God-given leadership role in the Pacific.
‘We, uh, have our own leaders,’ say Pacific islanders.
‘Yes, but they’re drowning your countries in debt!’ cry the politicos.
‘Well, we’re not perfect, but there’s no crisis,’ say our analysts. ‘Our debt to GDP ratio is less than half of Australia’s.’
‘China is slyly using debt/equity swaps to take over your infrastructure!’ Canberra cries.
‘No, actually. Our loans don’t contain language that would allow that,’ reply the islanders, who by this time are wondering why they even bother saying anything.
The Chinese Bases folderol is just the latest chorus in a litany of Australian indifference to Pacific voices. Every time some tendentious prat opens their mouth and starts telling the Pacific that what’s good for Australia is obviously good for us, the entire region sighs.
That jolt you just felt was a collective eye roll that nearly tipped the island.
Can we get something clear? If you want us to listen to you, you’ve got to listen to us.
It may have escaped your attention, but there was an earthquake in Papua New Guinea recently. It affected over half a million people, killing 150 outright and leaving 270,000 in need of humanitarian assistance. The situation remains desperate, and the breakdown of law and order in some areas has made it impossible for aid organisations to work.
You can be forgiven for not knowing this. There were no Chinese warships involved.
As you read this, massive ash falls from an active volcano are forcing 11,000 Ni Vanuatu to relocate for the second time in six months. Thousands may never return home. No Chinese warships were involved, so again, you might not have heard.
Make no mistake: When the Pacific is in need, Australia helps. It helps more than any other nation. But the overwhelming majority of Australians don’t seem to know or care that it does. If they knew, they’d probably care. But they don’t know, so they have no reason to care.
This is the fault of the media. Specifically, it’s an editorial failure. Reporters are champing at the bit to share our stories, but producers and editors constantly baulk at the time and expense of reporting from and about the Pacific islands.
On the morning Vanuatu announced the evacuation of 11,000 people from the volcanic island of Ambae, the journos who broke the Chinese base story were still in Vanuatu. When told the news, they doubted that Fairfax would pay for them to go to Ambae to report on the exodus.
This is the same company that gladly paid a team to spend a week reporting on a defence analyst’s fever dreams, someone whom the team members themselves admitted might be paranoid.
The main difference between Beijing and Canberra is that Beijing listens. For better or for worse, Chinese diplomats listen to what Pacific leaders want. Often enough, they give it to them.
And more often than not, Australian pollies wait patiently for Pacific islanders to finish speaking, then tell them what they need. There is a pervasive and deeply pernicious perception in the foreign policy establishment that Pacific voices don’t count.
A recent political cartoon in the Sydney Morning Herald distils the attitude prettily.
An island with nothing but a grass shack and a few benighted dark people is deserted by its erstwhile benefactors, and left to the tender mercies of a shipload of Asian hucksters.
Without Julie and Malcolm and the gang, we’re left helplessly clutching our cowries.
The image is so absurdly parochial it borders on outright racism.
Who benefits from these Chinese wharves? We do! The people of Vanuatu. You might have heard of us. We live here.
Beginning this week, that wharf will be the landing point for thousands of people displaced by natural disaster. Australian relief ships will no doubt be welcomed, too. Let’s see how many headlines our devastated lives derive.
My guess is zero—unless we invite the Chinese navy to help.
nnnnn
British Prime Minister Theresa May’s three-day visit to China, from January 31 to February 2, has amplifiedongoing debates in Europe about the costs and benefits of engagement with China and of Chinese investment. Attention to China’s role in fortunes of less developed economies has tended to focus on Africa. But as Beijing expands its One Belt, One Road investment and infrastructure campaign to encompass greater swaths of the globe, the often-overlooked small nations of the Pacific Islands are becoming a key testing ground for reactions to China’s growing economic and political clout. Chinese outreach to countries such as Tonga and Vanuatu in the form of foreign aid, cooperation on environmental and military affairs, and infrastructure investment has sparked competition for influence in the South Pacific with longstanding patrons of the region, including Australia and the United States. Canberra recently moved to fund the development of undersea Internet cables to the Solomon Islands after concerns its small island nation neighbor might work with China’s Huawei, whose deal to work on Internet infrastructure near Australia was viewed as a security threat. What’s at stake for China in these far-flung regions? Are regional and local concerns about Chinese investment justified? And how do they relate to similar debates elsewhere in the world? —The Editors
Original title: today, Hua Chun Ying mentioned this article in the Pacific island country. It is too sharp.
(Wen / observer network Zhu Xinwei)
"Slander or curb others won't respect themselves. On the island of care and assistance should not only lip service, but should be reflected in the real action." Hua Chunying said today at a regular press conference of the Ministry of foreign affairs.
Earlier, Australian officials had accused China of setting up a military base in Vanuatu and had been refuted by the tile side. A few days ago, the largest newspaper in Fiji published an article by a media leader in Vanuatu, which began to transfer residents from the volcanic eruption of ARMA island this week, and thousands of people were going to use the docks built by China, which was called the future China naval base, and the article called on Australia to listen to the island. Voice of the state, do not be obsessed with their "malicious speculation". A reporter inquired about the Ministry of foreign affairs.
"I saw the report." In response to this question, Hua Chunying made the response: "indeed, the countries concerned should lay down their voices and learn to truly listen to the voices of other countries or others. Slander or curb others won't respect themselves. "
Who is the media leader in Vanuatu? Observer network found this manuscript, the author is Dan Mercalli (Dan McGarry), is the media director of Vanuatu daily mail group.
Macquarie, in a bitter satire, said that Australia did not care about the island people, unless we invited the Chinese navy to rescue them. He also mentioned that in fact, reporters who hyped up "China built military bases" did not believe that it would be true.
The full text of the observer network translations is as follows:
Original title: want to lead the Pacific region? Learn to listen first
The ordinary Australian's perception of Pacific island countries is so poor that we even wonder whether they have any desire to understand us. The media, and the political forces, have been ignoring our voice and our reality directly. This is not the two time.
An Australian media claimed that China would build a military base not far from Brisbane, and Canberra's commentators immediately got the prize.
"It's never been planned," said a Vanuatu insider.
"Yes, but you talked about it!" The military commentator insisted that.
"No military bases have ever been discussed, nor will they be built in the future." The Minister of foreign affairs of Vanuatu said.
"Yes, but China's military strength is emerging." The military commentator insisted.
"Vanuatu will never agree. It is absolutely a malicious speculation." The Prime Minister of Vanuatu said.
"This is the wharf to be built!" The Australian media announced that a bunch of Cold War elements began to shout that Australia would lose the Pacific Leadership of God.
"Well... We have our own leaders. " The Pacific Islanders say.
"Yes, but they are dragging your country into debt quagmire!" (Australia) the politicians call.
"Nobody is perfect, but we have no crisis here." Analysts in China say, "our debt accounts for less than half of GDP in Australia."
"China is secretly using loans to grab your infrastructure!" Canberra is called.
"No no no no." The terms of our loan contract do not allow this to happen. The islanders answered.
The recent rumours about China's military bases are just another example of Australia's disregard for the voice of Taiping island. When we hear people exaggerate and talk about the education of the Pacific countries and the interests of Australia, we all agree with the Pacific Islands.
If you feel a shock, yes, it's the islanders in collectives (to Australia).
Out? If you want us to listen to you, you have to learn to listen first.
You may not remember that there was a recent earthquake in New Guinea, Papua.
More than 500 thousand people were killed, 150 were killed and 270 thousand needed humanitarian relief. The situation is still very bad, some places are chaotic, and the rescue can not start.
Of course, you do not know that it is also true that there is no Chinese warship there.
Due to volcanic eruption, 11 thousand Vanuatu people must transfer their residence second times in six months. Many of them may lose their hometown forever, but there is no Chinese warship in this story, so you may not know.
That's right: Australia has helped a lot more in the Pacific region than in other countries. But the vast majority of Australians do not matter at all.
Even if they know it, they don't care. But if they don't know, they will not care.
The responsibility lies in the media. To be precise, it is the failure of the editorial department. Journalists have to write interviews, but editors and directors always take into account the cost and cost performance of the Pacific island country survey.
When Vanuatu announced to evacuate 11 thousand people, the press corps of the Chinese military base had not yet gone, but journalists were worried that Fairfax media group might not want them to report evacuation on the Ambae island.
The media group is very willing to send a team to spend a week to interview a military commentator's delusion. Even reporters themselves admit that it may be unwarranted speculation.
The main difference between Beijing and Canberra is that Beijing is willing to listen. In any case, Chinese diplomats are willing to listen to the needs of Pacific leaders. And they often help.
Australians usually listen to statements from Pacific island countries, and then they start asking for their own demands. There is a widespread and vicious consensus in the diplomatic circle that the voice of the Pacific island countries does not matter.
A political cartoon published recently in the Sydney Morning Herald is a perfect interpretation of this attitude.
A deserted island above a straw shack, a few innocent blacks, and sincere alms, on the left is an Asian hawker.
If not for Bishop and Turnbull, we are still selling shells.
The meaning of this cartoon is so narrow and almost racist. Who will benefit from the Chinese wharf? We! The people of Vanuatu. You probably didn't hear it. We live here.
Starting this week, thousands of victims will dock at the pier. We also welcome Australian ships to come to rescue.
We see a few headlines when we see it.
I guess it's zero unless we invite the Chinese navy to rescue it.
Editor in responsibility: Liu Guangbo
“外交部发言人办公室”公众号 2018-07-18 17:58
https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_2273535
“外交部发言人办公室”公众号消息,在7月18日外交部例行记者会上,有记者问:澳大利亚外长毕晓普日前表示,中国可能给太平洋岛国带来不可持续的债务负担。另外,澳大利亚安全机构反对华为承建所罗门群岛海底光缆、参与澳5G网络建设。中方对此有何回应?
华春莹:关于你提到的澳大利亚外长的有关言论,已经不是一个新问题了。最近澳方个别官员和媒体也有过类似言论和炒作。
我非常想请问这些澳方官员:能不能举一个具体的例子来说明,到底哪个国家、什么时候、在哪些问题上是因为中国而产生了债务不可持续的问题。不能总是用“可能”这样的字眼进行无端猜测或作出先入为主、不负责任的臆断。
任何国家的经济起飞或者在工业化初期阶段都有巨大的资金需求,我们依据有关国家意愿,在力所能及范围内给予融资方面的支持,对于有关国家经济社会发展起到了雪中送炭的作用,受到了有关国家的一致肯定和欢迎。
我注意到,前段时间,不少太平洋岛国的官员和媒体都公开发声,对澳方有关错误言论进行了有力驳斥。
比如,汤加司法大臣说:“澳指责中国帮助贫困和亟需帮助的太平洋岛国,这令人感到悲哀。”
萨摩亚总理说:“澳官员的有关言论是对太平洋岛国领导人的侮辱,将会毁掉澳与太平洋岛国之间的友好关系。”
瓦努阿图《每日邮报》曾发表社论指出:“北京与堪培拉最大的不同在于,北京善于倾听太平洋岛国领导人的心声,并且常常给予岛国最需要的帮助,是谁从中国建造的码头获益?是我们瓦努阿图人民!澳方应该多听听我们的呼声,因为我们生活在这片土地上。”该社论还表示:“澳有关官员在讲话之前应该三思,澳也许应该放下正在扔向中国的石头,首先从自己的错误中汲取教训。”我想这已经很能说明问题了。希望澳方能够正确客观地看待中国与太平洋岛国的关系,同中方一道真心诚意地去帮助岛国实现可持续发展。
你提到澳安全机构反对华为承建所罗门群岛海底光缆、参与澳5G网络建设,我们对有关报道表示关切。中国政府一向鼓励中国企业按照市场原则和国际规则,在遵守当地法律的基础上开展对外投资合作。希望有关方面秉持客观和非歧视原则,为中国企业的正常商业活动提供公平的环境,多做有利于实现互利共赢的事情,而不是相反。
(原题为《中国可能给岛国带来不可持续的债务? 华春莹:停止不负责任的臆测》)
汤加图普六世国王参观中国援建的政府综合办公楼
中国援建的萨摩亚法院大楼
瓦努阿图总理萨尔维视察瓦努阿图塔纳公路一期建设项目
mmm
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Jenny Hayward-Jones
Jenny Hayward-Jonesis a Nonresident Fellow and former Director of the Melanesia Program at the Lowy Institute. Prior to joining the Lowy Institute, Hayward-Jones was an officer in the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade for 13 years. She worked as Policy Adviser to the Special Coordinator of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands in 2003-2004. Hayward-Jones holds a B.A. (Hons) in Political Science from Macquarie University and a M.A. in Foreign Affairs and Trade from Monash University. She is the author of various papers on Papua New Guinea, Fiji, Solomon Islands, and the changing geo-strategic environment in the South Pacific.
The growth of China’s interests and influence in the Pacific Islands is the biggest story of the decade in the Pacific Islands region. China has become the region’s second-largest trading partner and a significant investor. Although China delivers aid differently from the region’s traditional donors and mostly through concessional loans rather than grants, Lowy Institute research shows that China could now be the region’s third most significant aid partner, albeit still a long way behind Australia’s annual AUD1 billion expenditure. It is a remarkable advance from the situation only a decade ago, when China’s interests in Pacific Island states were largely motivated by its competition with Taiwan for diplomatic recognition and its aid contributions characterized as “checkbook diplomacy.”
Remarkable but controversial, particularly in Australia, which is going through another round of panic about growing Chinese influence in the Pacific (and in Australia itself) and perceptions of its own regional leadership inadequacies. Minister for International Development Concetta Fierravanti-Wells prompted the latest chapter in the debate on China’s rise and Australia’s apparent decline in the region with her recent criticism of Chinese aid.
China’s rise presents incredible opportunities for Pacific Island countries. They stand to benefit from greater investment in vital infrastructure (including via China’s One Belt, One Road initiative), increased trade in goods, tourism, education opportunities, and technological advances—driven by or enabled by China.
Chinese largesse in the region is not cost-free for Pacific Island nations. Concessional loans have led to increases in external debt and debt distress. Increased Chinese migration to Pacific Island countries has led to some displacement of local small-business owners.
China also expects support for Chinese positions at the United Nations and in other international forums. China’s Ambassador to Vanuatu, Liu Quan, told the Vanuatu Daily Post Editor Dan McGarry exactly this. “There is no free lunch,” Liu said—in case there was any doubt. But there is nothing unusual or sinister about this expectation.
No country can claim to be purely altruistic in their motives for delivering aid. For Pacific Island nations, committing a vote in support of nations bidding for leadership positions in international organizations or membership of U.N. committees costs them little and potentially earns them assistance in achieving national development priorities. Even expressing support for controversial positions, such as China’s defense of its actions in the South China Sea, as a means of managing good relations, carries little cost apart from raising a few eyebrows in Western capitals.
This relatively benign situation could change if Beijing’s expectations of Pacific Island governments extend further into the domestic arena. The management of relations with China becomes more challenging if Chinese companies make demands on land ownership or fishing rights that threaten the livelihoods of local communities. Pacific Island communities may not be bothered about which countries sit on the U.N. Human Rights Committee, but giving up rights to use land or fish in their own waters to Chinese interests is unlikely to be acceptable as a price to pay for Chinese investment in national infrastructure.
Pacific Island governments have proved themselves capable of determining their own national interests, managing a suite of diplomatic suitors, and projecting their own voice. They should be trusted to manage their own relationships with China.
Graeme Smith
Graeme Smith is a Senior Research Fellow with the Department of Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University, and co-host with Louisa Lim of The Little Red Podcast.
Bill Bishop made an excellent point when, in his Sinocism newsletter, he urged avoiding the phrase “Chinese influence,” when really we mean “Chinese Communist Party influence operations.” If that’s our definition, there’s not much to worry about in the Pacific. The Chinese Communist Party has little purchase among the small Chinese diasporas, and many mainland Chinese migrants to the region—particularly entrepreneurs from Fujian and Guangdong—are viewed by the Chinese state as a problem to control, rather than as a resource to harness. The diaspora businesspeople are thought to harm China’s image abroad and their take-no-prisoners approach to doing business—particularly in retail—will continue to cause resentment among Pacific islanders and be a destabilizing factor in the region.
The struggle is afoot for control over organizations claiming to represent Pacific Chinese communities across the region. But demographics means this battle will soon be settled: the “old Chinese communities” have been leaving for Australia and New Zealand since the 1970s. There are some influential businesspeople close to the Papua New Guinea leadership, but they largely act in their own commercial interest, which often intersects with P.R.C. interests, of course.
Militarily, some analysis gives the impression that the farce in the White House means that the U.S. has left the Pacific, and that without America the region would be wise to choose China. The United States Pacific Command is huge, and going nowhere. If anything, the debacle in Washington presents another opportunity for the professionals in the U.S. military to strengthen their position relative to the civilian administration. That said, the Chinese government has approached at least two Pacific governments to build facilities that would cause heartburn in Canberra and Wellington. They were rebuffed, but a nation under fiscal pressure—such as Tonga or Vanuatu—might be inclined to pay debts to China in kind. At the moment, this is limited to support for China’s position on the South China Sea and, in some cases, support for Beijing’s One China Policy.
With the rise of the Democratic Progressive Party in Taiwan, the battle for diplomatic recognition is back on, too. Fiji closed its Trade and Tourism Representative Office in Taipei last May after 20 years, just after Prime Minister Josaia Voreqe Bainimarama left the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing. With one-third of the states that recognize Taiwan found in the Pacific, Fiji’s move could lead others to shift their loyalties. Apart from a few lucky middlemen doing business with Beijing, ordinary Pacific islanders would be unlikely to benefit.
In terms of aid, larger Chinese contractors, both state-owned and private, exert pressure on individual politicians to endorse projects whose scope is beyond the needs of their country. The windfalls that they promise can distract politicians and bureaucrats from longer-term planning, particularly on roads, electricity generation, and other crucial infrastructure. The worst example of a Chinese company in the Pacific involves no ‘useless buildings’ or ‘roads to nowhere.’ The Chinese supplier of medical kits for Papua New Guinea’s health system was caught providing fake and overpriced drugs, resulting in a humanitarian disaster in a country ravaged by malaria and drug-resistant tuberculosis, most aid posts in PNG have no medicine at all.
That said, Chinese actors have the potential to be part of the solution in an arena of great concern in the Pacific: climate change. Beijing is keen to cooperate on solutions to this existential threat to many Pacific nations, yet Washington and Canberra don’t take it seriously, damaging their standing in the region. But one of many examples of Western negligence is seen in Exxon Mobil’s U.S.$19 billion gas venture in Papua New Guinea, now indanger of spiraling out of control.
Jacinta Keast
Jacinta Keast is a Research Assistant at China Matters, an Australian public policy initiative that focuses on the Australia-China relationship. She is a member of the Global Editorial Team of Young China Watchersand has previously published on East Asia Forum and at Young Australians in International Affairs as a China Fellow. She was previously a Research Intern at the Australian Studies Centre at Peking University and a Country Specialist on Fijian politics for the Global Leadership Project at the University of Texas. She completed her undergraduate degrees in Chinese Studies and International Business at the University of Sydney, Peking University, and the University of Hong Kong, and is a Westpac Bicentennial Foundation Scholar.
Let’s first assess how much the Pacific Islands really matter to China. The region is not a priority for the Belt and Road Initiative, and two-way trade between China and nations of the Pacific Island Forum only amounted to $US 7.5 billion in 2016. Even generous estimates of aid show only a small percentage of China’s entire outlay being delivered to the region. The Pacific Island nations care much more about bilateral outcomes than China does.
While Beijing’s foreign policy towards the Pacific Islands is certainly more nuanced than in the past, that does not mean the Pacific Islands hold the equivalent strategic or economic value of say, members of the African Union, or of ASEAN. Yet it’s likely that China will have a larger sphere of influence in the Pacific, due to reasons that are geopolitical as much as geographical—Australia, heretofore the region’s largest benefactor, has proposed its lowest-ever level of aid relative to GDP to a region in dire need of capital.
But the more pressing question remains—is Chinese capital necessarily detrimental to the prosperity and development of Pacific Island nations?
Many Pacific nations have, for the first time, a choice between two countries offering aid at such a large scale. That choice plays into the wider debate over autonomy in decision-making from their ‘big brothers,’ Australia and New Zealand. As Dame Meg Taylor, Secretary General of the Pacific Islands Forum, has noted, aid from China and other development partners comes with far fewer strings attached and faster approvals.
But Chinese aid also lacks transparency, and has been criticized for its role in misallocation of resources and embezzlement of Pacific government funds. Furthermore, there is a concern that a reliance on Chinese aid could impact the integrity of regional institutions and adversely affect government stability. The potential for lucrative funding can impact policy and votes in institutions like the Pacific Islands Forum, where China is a dialogue partner, and the Melanesian Spearhead Group, to which China is a key donor.
There is also the attendant risk of what happens when Pacific Island nations default on their concessional loans, the main form of Chinese aid to the region—a concern recently raised by the Deputy Managing Director of the IMF. Assuming Beijing does not forgive the debt, could the alternative payment then be votes for China in international organizations, military commitments, or the leasing of strategic ports as in Sri Lanka? Or perhaps domestic governments would raise taxes to pay down their debts, leading to political unrest or even violence?
While no aid partner is perfect, it’s ultimately difficult to weigh the overall efficacy of Chinese aid to the Pacific Islands without more disclosures and more transparency about Chinese projects in the region. Indeed, there are many policy areas where Chinese influence would be welcome. Working with Pacific governments on climate change and improving regional health outcomes could help allay fears about insidious investment in the region and genuinely improve China’s claim to be a responsible global actor.