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Kevin Rudd Questions About China and the U.S.
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The Top 10 Questions About China Ahead of Xi’s U.S. Visit
Follow Kevin Rudd on Twitter: www.twitter.com/MrKRuddhttps://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-rudd/china-questions-xi-jinping-us-visit_b_8169352.html
When President Xi Jinping arrives for his first state visit to the United States this week, a number of new domestic and foreign policy questions are likely to be on the minds of administrations in both capitals. How these are interpreted, and most importantly, managed, during the visit will shape the future of this core strategic relationship. And the content of this relationship will in turn shape much of the content of the future global rules-based order.
Here, at least in my judgment, are the top 10 questions on policy makers minds, both in Beijing and Washington, on the eve of Xi’s visit.
1. Just how much trouble is the Chinese economy really in?
Some, but nothing fundamental. The core problem for Chinese policy makers is embarking on an unavoidable, necessary and major reform of China’s growth model at a time of unexpectedly weak global growth. The traded sector of the economy has not provided a sufficient “growth buffer” during this complex process of re-engineering the policy model.
China is moving from a low-wage, labor intensive manufacturing for export strategy supported by a massive national infrastructure build to a new model based on rising domestic consumption, an expanding services sector and greater market share for the private sector. In essence, gradual increases in domestic consumption have thus far not offset larger falls in net exports.
2. Do Chinese economic managers know what they are doing?
Yes, but they are in uncharted waters because of the “economy in transition” factors referred to above. They cannot simply rely on the post ‘79 economic policy playbook. The Chinese leadership has spent much of the last three years sensitizing opinion both at home and abroad to a slower rate than the double-digit growth of the last 30 years.
Their core policy task is to maintain sufficient economic growth to sustain social stability. The leadership’s unofficial, unstated base figure here is around 6 percent in order to sustain improving living standards and generating enough jobs for the some 12 million new entrants to the labor market each year. If 6 percent growth is threatened, further monetary policy easing and fresh fiscal intervention will occur. Also, the leadership will always intervene to avoid the possibility of any form of financial crisis arising from one sector that might trigger a broader crisis in the real economy. They are keen students of both the Asian and global financial crises. Hence their recent and extraordinary intervention in the Shanghai equities market.
3. Is there a danger of Chinese economic collapse?
No. Chinese “collapsism“ was introduced to the American debate by renowned sinologist David Shambaugh earlier this year. Great headline. No evidence.
The problem with this thesis is that when real problems occur (e.g. the stock market turmoil), something akin to a stampede in China commentary occurs under the general, apocalyptic thematic that “the end is nigh.” This is particularly dangerous if it induces a broader American view that China is suddenly in decline. It is for naught. The parallel reality, however, is that China’s recent economic challenges should also induce a little more sobriety and a little less triumphalism for others who have concluded that China is some sort of unstoppable economic juggernaut. Both extremes in the China debate are as non-empirical as they are unhelpful.
4. Has Chinese economic reform stalled?
No, but the headwinds are strong. The reform blueprint announced two years ago outlined some 60 sets of policy measures to give effect to the transformation of the Chinese economic model. Unless these are implemented, China’s long-term economic prospects will falter. The Chinese leadership knows this.
So far, they have begun effective implementation of about a third of them. Where the rubber will really hit the road is when state-owned enterprise reform. Furthermore, if China denies real access to its financial and other services markets to foreign participants, China’s international competitiveness will stall. Bad for China. Bad for the world.
5. Is Xi Jinping in real political trouble?
No. His position is secure. Despite wild commentary about the possibility of political or military coups against Xi Jinping arising from the fallout of the anti-corruption campaign, or from recent challenges to the economy, there is zero evidence of this. Xi’s control of both the party and the military is as absolute as Deng Xiaoping’s once was. Perhaps more so. No credible analyst of Chinese politics can point to a single political figure who could organize and implement any action that threatens Xi’s hold on power.
6. Is Xi Jinping’s China becoming more nationalist?
Xi Jinping has always been a party loyalist and Chinese nationalist. Any analysis of his statements over many years would have concluded this long ago. Bear in mind, China has no particular monopoly on nationalist sentiment, either in Asia or elsewhere in the world. The real question here is the degree of focus of Chinese nationalist sentiment on Japan.
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s statement on the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII, and China’s reaction to it, underline the deep and continuing toxicity of this relationship. The uncomfortable truth for us all is that unless and until there is a fundamental reconciliation between Tokyo and Beijing, of the type achieved between Berlin and Paris after 1945, long-term regional stability in Asia will continue to be uncertain.
7. Is there any solution in sight on the three big problems that now dominate the discourse on U.S.-China relations: cyber, the South China Sea and China’s new proposed laws for the regulation of foreign NGOs?
Yes and no. On cyber, there is now perhaps sufficient mutual recognition that unless the two sides begin to negotiate genuine rules of the road, both on state and corporate cyber attacks, this has the potential to derail the relationship altogether.
On the South China Sea, despite the current strategic pause in land reclamation activities, there is no emerging consensus on how to resolve conflicting territorial claims, or U.S. concerns regarding freedom of navigation.
As for China’s proposed new NGO laws that (among other changes) would hand regulatory responsibility for control of foreign NGOs operating in China to the public security bureau, the law is still in draft form, submissions have been called for and it remains to be seen what amendments are accepted.
The problem for the long-term relationship is that there is a real danger that all three factors create a powerful combination of the U.S. national security, corporate and NGO establishments, forming a grand coalition against China. And that’s before we add the usual round of China-bashing in the U.S. presidential primaries season which is already underway. Wiser heads need to prevail all round in managing the dynamics of what has always been a difficult relationship given their significantly different values and interests. I doubt that either side wants to see long-term strategic drift into either conflict or war.
8. What strategic interests do Xi Jinping’s China and the U.S. really share?
More than you think actually. The bulk of the commentary on U.S.-China relations always focuses on the formidable bilateral challenges facing the relationship. Less attention is dedicated to where the two are working together, or could work together more.
This is a long list, including: North Korea’s nuclear program post-Iran; counter-terrorism against a range of militant Islamist groups; climate change; working together with regional countries including Japan, Korea and ASEAN on the development of longer-term security architecture which helps manage down regional security disputes, as well as the conclusion of an effective U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty.
9. Given this, is there any common strategic narrative possible for U.S.-China relations for the future that reduces the possibility of long-term conflict?
Part of the problem in the long-term U.S.-China strategic relationship is the absence of a common strategic narrative capable of embracing significant differences and commonalities at the same time. What the two countries’ leaders say to each other’s publics matters just as it matters what organizing principles exist within their respective administrations to govern or at least guide the long-term relationship.
10. Can ‘Constructive Realism’ be a path forward?
I have argued that what is needed is a common strategy of “constructive realism.” “Realist” in recognizing the major outstanding problems in the relationship where no resolution is anywhere in sight in areas such as Taiwan, the East and South China Seas and human rights. “Constructive” in the hard but doable areas of strategic collaboration identified above. Such a strategy must also anchored in a “Common Purpose” aimed at reforming and enhancing the global rules-based order anchored in the UN and the Bretton Woods machinery.
Constructive realism is based on the assumption that China already recognizes that however imperfect the current order might be, strengthening that order is better than no order at all. Better also to have a common strategic purpose with the United States than none at all, thus further running the risk of long-term and potentially irreparable strategic drift.
President Obama and President Xi, the international community wishes you well in your upcoming summit. It won’t be easy. But it matters to us all.
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/kevin-rudd/china-questions-xi-jinping-us-visit_b_8169352.html
When President Xi Jinping arrives for his first state visit to the United States this week, a number of new domestic and foreign policy questions are likely to be on the minds of administrations in both capitals. How these are interpreted, and most importantly, managed, during the visit will shape the future of this core strategic relationship. And the content of this relationship will in turn shape much of the content of the future global rules-based order.
Here, at least in my judgment, are the top 10 questions on policy makers minds, both in Beijing and Washington, on the eve of Xi’s visit.
1. Just how much trouble is the Chinese economy really in?
Some, but nothing fundamental. The core problem for Chinese policy makers is embarking on an unavoidable, necessary and major reform of China’s growth model at a time of unexpectedly weak global growth. The traded sector of the economy has not provided a sufficient “growth buffer” during this complex process of re-engineering the policy model.
China is moving from a low-wage, labor intensive manufacturing for export strategy supported by a massive national infrastructure build to a new model based on rising domestic consumption, an expanding services sector and greater market share for the private sector. In essence, gradual increases in domestic consumption have thus far not offset larger falls in net exports.
2. Do Chinese economic managers know what they are doing?
Yes, but they are in uncharted waters because of the “economy in transition” factors referred to above. They cannot simply rely on the post ‘79 economic policy playbook. The Chinese leadership has spent much of the last three years sensitizing opinion both at home and abroad to a slower rate than the double-digit growth of the last 30 years.
Their core policy task is to maintain sufficient economic growth to sustain social stability. The leadership’s unofficial, unstated base figure here is around 6 percent in order to sustain improving living standards and generating enough jobs for the some 12 million new entrants to the labor market each year. If 6 percent growth is threatened, further monetary policy easing and fresh fiscal intervention will occur. Also, the leadership will always intervene to avoid the possibility of any form of financial crisis arising from one sector that might trigger a broader crisis in the real economy. They are keen students of both the Asian and global financial crises. Hence their recent and extraordinary intervention in the Shanghai equities market.
3. Is there a danger of Chinese economic collapse?
No. Chinese “collapsism“ was introduced to the American debate by renowned sinologist David Shambaugh earlier this year. Great headline. No evidence.
The problem with this thesis is that when real problems occur (e.g. the stock market turmoil), something akin to a stampede in China commentary occurs under the general, apocalyptic thematic that “the end is nigh.” This is particularly dangerous if it induces a broader American view that China is suddenly in decline. It is for naught. The parallel reality, however, is that China’s recent economic challenges should also induce a little more sobriety and a little less triumphalism for others who have concluded that China is some sort of unstoppable economic juggernaut. Both extremes in the China debate are as non-empirical as they are unhelpful.
4. Has Chinese economic reform stalled?
No, but the headwinds are strong. The reform blueprint announced two years ago outlined some 60 sets of policy measures to give effect to the transformation of the Chinese economic model. Unless these are implemented, China’s long-term economic prospects will falter. The Chinese leadership knows this.
So far, they have begun effective implementation of about a third of them. Where the rubber will really hit the road is when state-owned enterprise reform. Furthermore, if China denies real access to its financial and other services markets to foreign participants, China’s international competitiveness will stall. Bad for China. Bad for the world.
5. Is Xi Jinping in real political trouble?
No. His position is secure. Despite wild commentary about the possibility of political or military coups against Xi Jinping arising from the fallout of the anti-corruption campaign, or from recent challenges to the economy, there is zero evidence of this. Xi’s control of both the party and the military is as absolute as Deng Xiaoping’s once was. Perhaps more so. No credible analyst of Chinese politics can point to a single political figure who could organize and implement any action that threatens Xi’s hold on power.
6. Is Xi Jinping’s China becoming more nationalist?
Xi Jinping has always been a party loyalist and Chinese nationalist. Any analysis of his statements over many years would have concluded this long ago. Bear in mind, China has no particular monopoly on nationalist sentiment, either in Asia or elsewhere in the world. The real question here is the degree of focus of Chinese nationalist sentiment on Japan.
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s statement on the 70th anniversary of the end of WWII, and China’s reaction to it, underline the deep and continuing toxicity of this relationship. The uncomfortable truth for us all is that unless and until there is a fundamental reconciliation between Tokyo and Beijing, of the type achieved between Berlin and Paris after 1945, long-term regional stability in Asia will continue to be uncertain.
7. Is there any solution in sight on the three big problems that now dominate the discourse on U.S.-China relations: cyber, the South China Sea and China’s new proposed laws for the regulation of foreign NGOs?
Yes and no. On cyber, there is now perhaps sufficient mutual recognition that unless the two sides begin to negotiate genuine rules of the road, both on state and corporate cyber attacks, this has the potential to derail the relationship altogether.
On the South China Sea, despite the current strategic pause in land reclamation activities, there is no emerging consensus on how to resolve conflicting territorial claims, or U.S. concerns regarding freedom of navigation.
As for China’s proposed new NGO laws that (among other changes) would hand regulatory responsibility for control of foreign NGOs operating in China to the public security bureau, the law is still in draft form, submissions have been called for and it remains to be seen what amendments are accepted.
The problem for the long-term relationship is that there is a real danger that all three factors create a powerful combination of the U.S. national security, corporate and NGO establishments, forming a grand coalition against China. And that’s before we add the usual round of China-bashing in the U.S. presidential primaries season which is already underway. Wiser heads need to prevail all round in managing the dynamics of what has always been a difficult relationship given their significantly different values and interests. I doubt that either side wants to see long-term strategic drift into either conflict or war.
8. What strategic interests do Xi Jinping’s China and the U.S. really share?
More than you think actually. The bulk of the commentary on U.S.-China relations always focuses on the formidable bilateral challenges facing the relationship. Less attention is dedicated to where the two are working together, or could work together more.
This is a long list, including: North Korea’s nuclear program post-Iran; counter-terrorism against a range of militant Islamist groups; climate change; working together with regional countries including Japan, Korea and ASEAN on the development of longer-term security architecture which helps manage down regional security disputes, as well as the conclusion of an effective U.S.-China bilateral investment treaty.
9. Given this, is there any common strategic narrative possible for U.S.-China relations for the future that reduces the possibility of long-term conflict?
Part of the problem in the long-term U.S.-China strategic relationship is the absence of a common strategic narrative capable of embracing significant differences and commonalities at the same time. What the two countries’ leaders say to each other’s publics matters just as it matters what organizing principles exist within their respective administrations to govern or at least guide the long-term relationship.
10. Can ‘Constructive Realism’ be a path forward?
I have argued that what is needed is a common strategy of “constructive realism.” “Realist” in recognizing the major outstanding problems in the relationship where no resolution is anywhere in sight in areas such as Taiwan, the East and South China Seas and human rights. “Constructive” in the hard but doable areas of strategic collaboration identified above. Such a strategy must also anchored in a “Common Purpose” aimed at reforming and enhancing the global rules-based order anchored in the UN and the Bretton Woods machinery.
Constructive realism is based on the assumption that China already recognizes that however imperfect the current order might be, strengthening that order is better than no order at all. Better also to have a common strategic purpose with the United States than none at all, thus further running the risk of long-term and potentially irreparable strategic drift.
President Obama and President Xi, the international community wishes you well in your upcoming summit. It won’t be easy. But it matters to us all.
陆克文：十问美国对华新战略
Kevin Rudd 2018-10-27 08:16:03
今年
11月，我们将迎来第一次世界大战结束100周年的纪念日。20世纪初的那场大国战争曾被称为“终战之战”，当然它的实际情况完全不是这样。由于一系列人们未能预料到的灾难性后果，更多战争接踵而至，全球地缘政治版图被一而再、再而三地重绘。
尽管中美关系下个阶段的轨迹还远远没有定型，但当未来的人们回顾2018年时，很可能会发现这一年标志着21世纪两大强国从和平共处转向某种新形式的对抗。
本月早些时候，美国副总统迈克•彭斯在哈德逊研究所发表演讲，指责中国贸易行为不公平，窃取知识产权，强化军事进攻以及干涉美国国内政治。特朗普政府早已开始重新定义未来的美国对华战略，彭斯的讲话只是美国一系列官方权威声明和政策当中最新的一个。其它文件和事件包括去年12月的《美国国家安全战略报告》，今年1月的《美国国防战略报告》，9月美国国防部关于制造业和国防工业基础的报告，当然还有今年6月美国挑起的对华贸易战。
美国的这一系列原则声明意味着过去40年的对华战略接触期告终，取而代之的是全新的战略竞争时期。美国的种种转变都基于同一假设：此前的对华接触政策失败了; 中国国内市场没有对外国商品和投资充分开放; 中国在建立另一套具有中国特色的国际秩序，而不是在以规则为基础的全球秩序当中扮演负责任的利益攸关方角色; 以及中国国内政治不但没有变得更民主，反而进一步走向了列宁主义。
如今，中国的军事和经济综合实力已经对美国的全球主导地位构成了挑战。基于这一事实，华盛顿方面做出压制中国外交政策和经济战略的决定，是无可避免的结构性回应。美国公开的对华政策与以往截然不同，这种全新方法似乎得到了美国政府机构、国会以及大批企业的广泛支持。但在考虑实施这套政策带来的影响时，美国的战略学者需要为可能导致的意外后果做好预案——这些可能性包括中美关系从战略竞争迅速恶化到“脱钩”，走向对抗、遏制，甚至最终爆发武装冲突。
中美战略竞争关系十问
随着华盛顿方面开启根本性转变，将战略宣告变为可执行的政策，美国及其合作伙伴和盟国必须要考虑一系列重大问题。
首先，美国最终期望获得什么？如果中国非但不顺从彭斯在演讲中提出的要求——包括“公平且对等”的贸易协议，结束“对美国知识产权的盗窃行为”和“强制技术转移的掠夺性做法”——而且还提出明确的反驳，美国应该怎么做？如果美国的新战略不仅没有达成预期目标，反而使中国更偏向重商主义、民族主义，使其斗志更加昂扬，又应该怎么办？这里有两个宽泛的可能性：中国要么顺应美国的意愿做出让步，要么加倍力推现行政策。
其次，如果说我们当前处于战略竞争时期，那么新的游戏规则究竟是什么？中美两国要如何就这些新规则取得共识？还是说，除了在战略竞争你来我往之间逐渐形成的规则之外，已经毫无其他规则可言了？今后美国要如何处理海上（例如不久前中国军舰迫近美军迪凯特舰事件）、空中、网络上的危险事件？以及如何应对核扩撒、第三国境内的战略竞争、美国国库券购买和销售、汇率变化等主要政策领域的变化？
第三个问题与前两点密切相关：今天的中美两国之间是否还可能拥有共同的战略叙事，并以之作为两国未来双边关系的理论参量？既然当前还没有新规则能界定两国关系的参量，两国对双边关系的根本点又缺乏共同的概念框架，中美两大强国要如何避免在有意或无意间滑向新的冷战，进而爆发热战？
第四，鉴于美国某些战略规划者可能正在考虑进一步调整对华政策，从战略竞争升级为全方位遏制和全面经济脱钩，乔治•凯南1946年发给国会的“长电报”和他次年以“X”为笔名在《外交事务》上发表的文章《苏联行为的根源》都值得仔细阅读。凯南认为，如果美国的遏制战略正确实施，苏联很可能在内部压力的作用下分裂。然而把这个假设应用到今天的中国身上则有过分夸大之嫌，如果美国推行类似的冷战政策，内部矛盾会压垮中国的体制吗？中国经济规模之庞大，它与美国以外的其他国家经济接触程度之深，新技术赋予国家的管控能力之强，应该让那些认为中国会成为下一个苏联的人停下来仔细想一想。
第五，难道美国真的认为中国威权资本主义跟苏联共产主义一样，对民主资本主义构成了严峻的意识形态挑战吗？苏联在世界各地扶植了大批与其意识形态相近的附庸国。有什么证据表明中国也在这样做？如果有，那么中国这样做到底是成功了还是失败了？还是说，中国的做法其实与苏联存在本质上的差异？中国对其他国家的政治体制基本持一种近于不可知论的态度，它只是借着经济占全球份额不断扩大的势头，建立了一支各国自愿加入联盟，而中国只有在对外利益受到威胁时才会动用这部分政治资源。
第六，面对中国价值数万亿美元的一系列金融和经济承诺——包括“一带一路”倡议、特惠贷款、对口援助等——美国是否拿得出对等的战略方案？华盛顿方面是否还会继续削减对外援助预算并缩小援助人员规模？美国当年能从苏联人手里争取到西欧，靠的是马歇尔计划。今天的美国光凭与欧亚、非洲和拉美国家的友好感情，不足以在与中国的战略竞争中取胜。
第七，在特惠贷款和赠予援助以外，更深层次的问题是，美国今后将如何与中国在亚洲和欧洲的大规模贸易投资进行竞争？美国取消了与亚洲国家的“跨太平洋伙伴关系协定”以及与欧洲的“跨大西洋贸易和投资伙伴关系协定”，这将如何影响未来美国在亚欧地区贸易、投资和技术合作中的重要性？对亚洲和非洲来说，中国已经是比美国更重要的经济伙伴。同样的情况可能很快会出现在欧洲和拉丁美洲。
第八，鉴于以上这些原因，美国有信心让盟国接受其对华竞争战略吗？美国的许多盟国可能会选择两面下注、骑墙居中，静观美国的转变究竟是暂时的还是永久的，是成功的还是失败的。
第九，美国要怎样从思想观念上争取其他国家，才能使它们不支持中国获得地区和全球主导权，转而支持美国新战略带来的替代方案？彭斯虽然吹响了战斗号角，但那场口才上佳的演说以美国利益为主线，完全没有诉诸国际社会的共同利益和共同价值观，而二战后美国领导以规则为基础的国际秩序时对此曾有清晰的阐述。 “闪亮的山巅之城”今日安在？我们是否不得不在两个现实主义大国之间做选择？
最后，美国和盟国的战略学者还要考虑一个问题，即中美关系一旦决裂，近期内全球经济和全球应对气候变化的行动将遭受怎样的影响？如果中美两国经济彻底脱钩，双边贸易即便不崩溃也会显著下降；它将反过来对美国和全球经济明年的增长造成严重的负面冲击，甚至可能引发全球性经济衰退。再来看联合国不久前发布的气候变化报告，该报告警告称由于主要碳排放国家迄今未能采取足够的行动，地球可能面临灾难。如果全球环境秩序失灵，中国回归从前的国家碳排放标准，降低约束将意味着什么？中国目前恪守2015年在《巴黎气候变化协议》中作出的承诺。美国缺席谈判已经给应对气候变化制度造成了不利影响。如果美国正式退出巴黎气变协议或者中美关系大面积恶化，中国都可能退出巴黎协议。尽管当前的美国政府可能并不在乎这一点，但美国几乎所有的盟国都对此非常重视。
第三条路？
许多人基于工作需要，数十年如一日地关注中国崛起，尤其关注中美关系。他们十分清楚，上述问题牵涉到思维和政策的高度复杂性。可我仍然担心，随着谩骂诋毁中国的现象在美国越来越常见，社会上开放、审慎讨论对华关系的公共空间不断缩小。
在中美关系的复杂性面前，那些寻求解决方案的人可能落下“绥靖者”或“熊猫拥抱者”的骂名；而那些建议美国采取更强硬措施的人则被简单地批评为“冷战战士”甚至“战争贩子”。
我们还需对任何新形式的麦卡锡主义保持警惕，避免对那些试图解释中国崛起复杂性的美国人扣上“非我族类”的帽子，因为他们要回应的问题看似简单实则至关重要，那就是中国现在在做什么，与过去有什么不同，以及我们应该怎么办？在美国的外交战略界，包括智库和学府，尚处于酝酿之中的对华思维已经开始悸动。在这个关键时刻，我们在分析和决策时都应该力求清晰明确。
随着全球掀起一场关于中国的大讨论，我作为澳美百年同盟的长期支持者，坚决站在避免战争的一边。中美两国并不是非战不可。换句话说，中美双方以及国际社会都需要在投降和对抗之外寻找可靠的第三条路，帮助我们绕开修昔底德陷阱。
（观察者网杨晗轶译自《外交事务》）
Ten Questions About the New U.S. China Strategy
When future generations look back on 2018, it could well be as the year in which the relationship between the two great powers of the twenty-first century—the United States and China—shifted from peaceful coexistence to a new form of confrontation, although its final trajectory remains far from certain.
In a speech at the Hudson Institute earlier this month, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence accused China of unfair trade practices, intellectual property theft, increasing military aggression, and interference in the United States’ domestic politics. The vice president’s speech is the latest in a long line of authoritative statements and policies from the Trump administration redefining future U.S. strategy toward China. These include the U.S. National Security Strategy published last December, January’s new U.S. Defense Strategy, last month’s Department of Defense report on the future of U.S. defense manufacturing and, of course, the initiation of the trade war with China in June.
This series of doctrinal statements by the United States has formally declared an end to a 40-year period of U.S. strategic engagement with China, and its replacement with a new period of strategic competition. All rest on the assumption that engagement has failed; that China’s domestic market has not opened up sufficiently to foreign export and investment penetration; that, rather than becoming a responsible stakeholder in the global rules-based order, China is now developing an alternative international order with Chinese characteristics; and that instead of becoming more democratic in its domestic politics, Beijing has now decided to double down as a Leninist state.
Washington’s decision to push back against Chinese foreign policy and economic strategy is an inevitable structural response to the fact that China’s aggregate military and economic power has now begun to challenge U.S. global dominance. This radically new approach to U.S. declaratory policy toward China also appears to have attracted widespread support across U.S. government agencies, from the U.S. Congress, and from a wide cross-section of U.S. businesses. But as U.S. strategists think through its operational implications, they will need to anticipate and deal with a number of potential unintended consequences—including the possibility of a rapid escalation from strategic competition to decoupling to confrontation, containment, and, perhaps, ultimately, to armed conflict.
TEN QUESTIONS ABOUT STRATEGIC COMPETITION
The United States and its partners and allies around the world will need to consider a number of critical questions as Washington undertakes the translation of this fundamental change in declaratory strategy into operational policy. First, what is the United States’ desired endpoint? What does the United States do if China does not acquiesce to the demands outlined in the vice president’s speech—including a “fair and reciprocal” trade deal, and ends to “the theft of American intellectual property” and “the predatory practice of forced technology transfer”—but instead explicitly rejects them? What happens if the new U.S. strategy not only fails to produce the desired objective but instead produces the reverse, namely an increasingly mercantilist, nationalist, and combative China? There are two broad possibilities here: either Beijing will concede to the changes that Washington wants, or it will double down on its current policies.
Second, if we are now in a period of strategic competition, what are the new rules of the game? How can Washington reach a common understanding with Beijing as to what these new rules might be? Or are there now to be no rules other than those which may be fashioned over time by the new operational dynamics of strategic competition? How, for example, will the United States now manage dangerous incidents at sea (such as recently occurred when a Chinese warship came within 45 yards of the USS Decatur’s bow); incidents in the air; cyberattacks; nuclear proliferation; strategic competition in third countries; the purchase and sale of U.S. Treasury Notes; the future of the exchange rate; and other major policy domains?
Third, and closely related to these first two questions, is whether or not any common strategic narrative between China and the United States is now possible to set the conceptual parameters for the future bilateral relationship. In the absence of new rules that delimit the parameters of the relationship, and without a common conceptual framework of what the relationship is ultimately about, how can these two powers avoid, consciously or subconsciously, simply sliding into a new Cold War? And then a hot one?
Fourth, to the extent that some U.S. strategic planners may be considering further reorienting U.S. China policy from strategic competition toward full-blooded containment and comprehensive economic decoupling, George Kennan’s famous “Long Telegram” of 1946 and his “X” article on “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” published in Foreign Affairs the following year, are worth a careful rereading. Kennan argued that if properly contained the Soviet Union would likely break up under the weight of its internal pressures. It would be a heroic assumption, however, that holds that in a new Cold War, the Chinese system would collapse under the weight of its own internal contradictions should a similar policy be applied. It might. But the size of China’s domestic economy, the extent of its continuing economic engagement with the rest of the non-U.S. world, together with the new technologies of political control now available to an authoritarian state, should give those who think that China will turn out just like the Soviet Union pause for thought.
Fifth, is the United States convinced that Chinese authoritarian capitalism actually poses a potent ideological challenge to democratic capitalism, the way that Soviet communism once did? The Soviet Union constructed client regimes around the world of a similar ideological nature to its own. Is there evidence that China is doing the same? If there is, what is the evidence to date of China’s success or failure? Or is China doing something qualitatively different—essentially being agnostic about the domestic political systems of other states, while still building their own coalition of the willing around the world based on the growing size of China’s global economic footprint, to be drawn upon when Chinese foreign policy interests are at stake?
Sixth, is the United States prepared to make a strategic counteroffer to the world to the financial and economic commitment reflected in a multitrillion-dollar set of Chinese programs—including the Belt and Road Initiative, concessional loans, and bilateral aid flows? Or will Washington continue to slash its own aid budgets and reduce the size of its foreign service? The United States won western Europe from the Soviet Union because of the Marshall Plan. It will not win its strategic competition with China on the basis of fine sentiment alone in Eurasia, Africa, and Latin America.
Seventh, beyond concessional finance and grant aid, there is the broader question of how the United States will compete over time with the magnitude of China’s trade and investment volumes in both Asia and Europe. How will the cancellation of the Trans-Pacific Partnership with Asia and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, its counterpart with Europe, affect the relative significance of the United States as a trade, investment, and technology partner with these regions in the future? Beijing is already a bigger economic partner with Asia and Africa than with Washington. Europe and Latin America are likely to follow.
How confident is the United States that its friends and allies around the world will embrace its newly competitive strategy toward China?
Eighth, for these and other reasons, how confident is the United States that its friends and allies around the world will embrace its newly competitive strategy toward China? Many U.S. allies may decide to hedge their bets, waiting until it becomes clearer whether this U.S. shift is permanent and whether it will succeed.
Ninth, what ideational case can the United States make to the world for supporting its new strategy as an alternative to Chinese regional and global domination? Pence consciously and eloquently couched his call to arms in terms of U.S. interests. But he made no appeal to the international community based on common interests and shared values, which have been historically articulated though the U.S.-led, rules-based order crafted after World War II. Where is the shining city on the hill? Or are we left with a choice between one realist power and another?
Finally, U.S. and allied strategists need also to consider how a major cleavage in U.S.-Chinese relations would affect the global economy and global action on climate change in the more immediate term. A radical decoupling of the U.S. and Chinese economies could lead bilateral trade to collapse, or else fall significantly; this shock would in turn have a significant negative impact on U.S. and global growth in 2019, possibly even triggering a worldwide recession. Or consider the just-released United Nations report on climate change, which warns of potential planetary disaster because the world’s major carbon emitters have failed to take adequate action so far. What will happen if China reverts to its own more limited national measures at carbon mitigation in the absence of a functioning global environmental order? China is at present bound by its commitments made under the 2015 Paris agreement on climate change. The United States’ absence from the negotiating table is already seeing a weakening of that regime. China may use formal U.S. withdrawal from Paris, or a wider collapse in the U.S.-Chinese relationship, to walk away altogether. Although the current U.S. administration may not care about this, practically all of its allies do.
A THIRD WAY?
Those who have spent decades dealing professionally with the rise of China in general, and the U.S.-Chinese relationship in particular, know that these are challenges of formidable intellectual and policymaking complexity. Nonetheless, I fear that the public space for open, considered debate and discussion on the China question is shrinking as name-calling grows. There is a danger that those who seek to address complexity are accused of being China appeasers or “panda huggers.” And that those who recommend a harder-line approach are simply written off as unrequited Cold War warriors or just plain warmongers. We also need to be wary of the emergence of any form of new McCarthyism, whereby anyone seeking to explain the complexity of China’s rise is simply accused of “un-American” activities if they off a complex response to what are otherwise rendered as simple but critical questions—namely what is China now doing, what is different, and what should the rest of us do about it. There are already tremors of this emerging around the edges of the foreign and strategic policy community, including think tanks and the academy. What we should all be seeking, at critical times like this, is analytical and policy clarity.
At this stage of the unfolding great global debate on China, as a lifelong supporter of Australia’s 100-year alliance with the United States, I’m on the side of avoiding an unnecessary war between the United States and China. In other words, both Washington and Beijing, together with others in the international community, need to identify whether there is a credible third way, beyond the demands of either capitulation or confrontation, to help navigate our way through the Thucydidean dilemma that we now confront.
