Populism is a buzzword in the media around the world. There is virtually not a politician who has not been labeled populist at one time. In fact, accused would be a better term, as most people use populism is a Kampfbegriff to defame a political opponent. Few politicians self-identify as populist. Those who do usually first redefine the term in a way that is closer to the popular use of democracy than of populism.

In the public debate populism is mostly used to denounce a form of politics that uses (a combination of) demagogy, charismatic leadership, or a Stammtisch (pub) discourse. None of the three are accurate understandings of populism. While some populists might promise everything to everyone (i.e. demagogy) or speak a simple, even vulgar, language (i.e. Stammtisch discourse), many do not. More importantly, many non-populist populists also do this, particularly during election campaigns. Similarly, while some successful populists are charismatic leaders, some are not, and many successful non-populists are also considered charismatic.

Instead, populism is best defined as a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté general (general will) of the people. This means that populism is a particular view on how society is and should be structured, but it addresses only a limited part of the larger political agenda. For example, it says little about the ideal economic or political system that a (populist) state should have. Its essential features are: morality and monism.

The key point is that populism sees both groups as essentially homogeneous, i.e. without fundamental internal divisions, and considers the essence of the division between the two groups to be moral. Consequently, its main opposites are elitism and pluralism. Elitism sees the same major division, but considers the elite to be pure and the people as corrupt. Pluralism has a fundamentally different worldview than both elitism and populism, seeing society as divided into several groups with different interests and favoring a politics based on consensus between these groups.

Contrary to what defenders and opponents may claim, populism is neither the essence nor thenegation of democracy. To put it simply, populism is pro-democracy, but anti-liberal democracy. It supports popular sovereignty and majority rule, but rejects pluralism and minority rights. In the European context, populism can be seen as an illiberal democratic answer to problems created by an undemocratic liberalism. Criticizing the decade-old trend to depoliticize controversial issues by placing them outside of the national democratic (i.e. electoral) realm, by transferring them to supranational institutions like the European Union or to (neo-)liberal institutions like courts and central banks, populists call for the re-politicization of issues like European integration, gay rights, or immigration.

A final point to note is that populism is neither right nor left; or, perhaps better, populism can be found on both the left and the right. This is not exactly the same as saying that populism is like a “chameleon,” as it is not necessarily the same populist actor who changes colors. Populism rarely exists in a pure form, in the sense that most populist actors combine it with another ideology. This so-called host ideology, which tends to be very stable, is either left or right. Generally, left populists will combine populism with some interpretation of socialism, while right populists will combine it with some form of nationalism. Today populism is more on the left in Southern Europe and more on the right in Northern Europe.

Although populism has a long history in Europe, it has always been a marginal political phenomenon. It emerged for the first time in Russia in the late-19th century. The so-called Narodniki were a relatively small group of urban elites who unsuccessfully tried to stir a peasant revolt. While unsuccessful in Russia, Nardoniki did have a strong influence in Eastern Europe, where several agrarian populist parties existed in the early 20th century. Most of these groups had little political influence in the largely authoritarian states of that period. And while both communism and fascism used populist rhetoric, particularly during the movement stage, both ideologies and regimes were essentially elitist.

Post-war Europe saw very little populism until the 1990s. There was Poujadism in France in the late-1950s, the Danish and Norwegian Progress Parties in the 1970s, and PASOK in the 1980s, but all these movements were largely sui genesis rather than part of a broader populist moment. This changed with the rise of the populist radical right in the late 1980s. Although the oldest parties of this group, like the National Front (FN) in France and the Flemish Bloc (now Flemish Interest, VB) in Belgium, started out as elitist parties, they soon embraced a populist platform with slogans like “We Say What You Think” and “The Voice of the People.” In recent years a new left populism has also emerged in some countries, particularly in Southern Europe. 

Table 1 lists the most important populist parties in Europe today – only the most successful party in each country is included. The third column gives the electoral result in the most recent European election of May 2014, which vary from 51.5 percent to 3.7 percent of the vote – note that countries without a successful populist party are excluded (e.g. Luxembourg, Portugal or Slovenia). On average, populist parties gained some 12.5 percent of the vote in the last European elections; not insignificant, but hardly a “political earthquake” as the international media claimed.

A better insight into the electoral and political relevance of populist parties is provided by the results in the most recent national elections. The fourth column gives the result of the most successful populist party in the country, the fifth column its ranking among all national parties, the sixth the total electoral support of all populist parties in the country, and the seventh column the change in the total national populist vote between the most recent and the previous national election. Here are the most important lessons to be drawn. 

First, populist parties are electorally successful in most European countries. In roughly twenty European countries a populist party gains at least 10 percent of the national vote. Second, all populist parties together score an average of ca. 16.5% of the vote in national elections. This ranges from a staggering 65 percent in Hungary, shared between Fidesz and the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik), to 5.6 percent in Belgium. Third, while the overall trend is up, most populist parties are electorally volatile. Few populist parties have been able to establish themselves as relatively stable political forces in their national party system. Fourth, there are huge cross-national and cross-temporal differences within Europe. While some populist parties are brand-new (e.g. M5S and Podemos), others are several decades old (e.g. FN, FPÖ, The Left, SVP). Similarly, whereas some parties are on the up (e.g. DF, SYRIZA, UKIP), others are in a downfall (e.g. PP-DD and VB).

When we are focusing only on the (minority of) European countries where populism is a major political phenomenon, there are four important conclusions to draw. First, in five countries a populist party is the biggest political party – Greece, Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, and Switzerland. Second, populist parties gained a majority of votes in three countries – Hungary, Italy, and Slovakia. However, in at least two of these countries the main populist parties are strongly opposed to collaboration. The situation in Hungary is most striking, as both its main governmental party (Fidesz) and its main opposition party (Jobbik) is populist. Third, populist parties are currently in the national government in seven countries – Finland, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Norway, Slovakia, and Switzerland. Greece is unique in that it has a populist coalition government of a left and a right populist party. Fourth, and final, in six countries a populist party is part of the established political parties – Hungary, Italy, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, and Switzerland. This is important to note, as populism is normally associated exclusively with challenger parties and deemed incapable of establishing itself in a political system. Yet, while populist parties have to be extra careful not to be considered part of ‘the elite’, populists like former Italian premier Silvio Berlusconi and current Hungarian premier Viktor Orbán have been successful at retaining their cleverly constructed ‘outsider’ status in power.

Given the immense academic interest in the phenomenon of populism one would assume that we have a good understanding of why populist parties are successful and, even more specific, under which circumstances they rise and decline. This is not the case. Most analyses of European populism focus almost exclusively on one type of populist parties, notably the populist radical right, and particularly its non-populist aspects. However, immigration has little explanatory power for populist parties in countries that have little immigration (like Hungary and Poland) or for populist parties that don’t oppose immigration (such as Podemos or SYRIZA). At the same time, the most popular theories are often too broad and vague. While crisis and globalization have some relationship to the rise of populism, globalization is related to everything and crisis is usually undefined and simply used whenever a populist party becomes successful (making the ‘theory’ tautological). The following four reasons are also quite broad, and to a certain extent vague, but indicate some important factors that address both the demand-side and supply-side of populist politics.

First, large parts of the European electorates believe that important issues are not (adequately) addressed by the political elites. This relates to issues like European integration and immigration, on which established parties have long been unwilling to campaign, as well as socio-economic issues like unemployment and welfare state reform, particularly in light of the current economic crisis. While it seems fair to argue that political elites have indeed been less forthcoming and successful in addressing important issues, and to a larger extent than in previous periods (i.e. before the 1990s), what is more important to note is that large parts of the European populations have come to perceive this as a major problem. This has created widespread political dissatisfaction, which is a fertile breeding ground for populist parties, but also for other anti-establishment parties, such asCiudadanos (Citizens) in Spain.

Second, national political elites are increasingly perceived as being “all the same.” Again, the perception is more important than the reality, although the two are not unrelated. While commentators have decried the so-called “end of ideology” since the late 1960s, there is little doubt that the situation today is much more extreme. Responding to the structural transformation of European societies as a consequence of the “post-industrial revolution,” including the decline of the working class and secularization, the main established parties have moderated their ideologies and converged strongly on both socio-cultural and socio-economic issues. The emergence of the “neue Mitte” (new center) and “Third Way” on the center-left, which by and large transformed social democratic parties into center-right parties targeting the same voters as the Christian democratic and conservative-liberal parties, alienated a large part of the remaining working class and left more ideological voters of both left and right without a political voice.

Third, more and more people see the national politically elites as essentially “powerless”. Again, perception and reality are closely linked, even if many people will necessarily be accurately informed. In the past decades European elites have engaged in one of the most amazing transfers of power from the national to the supranational. Rarely have politicians so happily marginalized themselves. Of particular importance was the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, which has taken many important issues out of the national democratic realm and transferred them to the much less democratic EU sphere. This was, of course, most notably the case for the countries that joined the Eurozone, which no longer control their own currency or monetary policy. At the same time, the process of “cognitive mobilization” has made the European people better educated and more independent, and consequently more critical and less deferential toward the political elites. Getting mixed messages from the political elites, who claim to be powerless in the case of unpopular policies (“the results of the EU/globalization/US”) but in full control in the case of popular policies (“my successful economic policies”), European populations feel confident to judge their politicians to be incompetent or even deceitful.

Fourth, the media structure has become much more favorable to political challengers. Until at least the 1980s the established parties controlled most of the important media in Europe, be it party-owned newspapers or state radio and television controlled by parties-appointed boards. While active censorship was rare, most journalists self-censored stories that challenged the interests and values of the political mainstream. Consequently, critique of immigration or European integration was long marginalized, while major corruption, particularly involving elites from several established parties, was left uncovered. This is no longer possible in a world dominated by party-independent, private media and an uncontrollable Internet. Not only do all stories and voices find an outlet, populist stories and voices are particularly attractive to a media dominated by an economic logic. After all, scandals and controversy sell!

Finally, while the previous four factors have created a fertile breeding ground and favorable ‘discursive opportunity structure’ for populists, the success of populist parties like the FN or SYRIZA is also related to the fact that populist actors have become much more “attractive” to voters (and media). Almost all successful populist parties have skillful people at the top, including media-savvy leaders like Beppe Grillo (M5S), Pablo Iglesias (Podemos), or Geert Wilders (PVV). They can not only hold their own in political debates with leaders of established parties, but they are often much more adept at exploiting the huge potential of new resources, such as social media. For example, for years Wilders dominated the Dutch political debate purely through Twitter. Just one well-constructed tweet would be picked up by journalists, who would then force established politicians to respond, and thereby helped Wilders set the political agenda and frame the political debate.

Cas Mudde is associate professor in the School of Public and International Affairs at the University of Georgia (USA). He is the author of Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (2007) and editor ofYouth and the Extreme Right (2014), Political Extremism (2014), andPopulism in Europe and Latin America: Corrective or Threat for Democracy? (2012). He is a member of the Scholars Strategy Network and can be followed on Twitter at @casmudde. 

Articles by Cas Mudde

Constitutional conventions: best practice

 The Polish boomerang: how Warsaw’s adoption of the 'Budapest Model' could threaten the original in Hungary

CAS MUDDE 12 January 2016

The new Polish government seems keen on following the authoritarian 'Budapest model' promulgated by illiberal democrat Viktor Orbán, but this could backfire on the Hungarian leader.

 2015 and the struggle for Europe’s core

CAS MUDDE 28 December 2015

2015 was the year that everyone could see that the European emperor is not (not any longer) wearing clothes. Worse, the emperor didn’t even deny that he was naked! 

 European democracy after Paris

CAS MUDDE 1 December 2015

Ironically, as political distrust and dissatisfaction are at all-time highs in Europe, the vast majority of people are still willing to give unprecedented powers to the leaders they don’t like or trust. 

 Overcoming the European refugee crisis

CAS MUDDE 5 November 2015

With no sign of the refugee crisis slowing down, here are five key principles for action which are both more humane towards migrants, and more broadly supported by the European publics.

 As Europe looks fearfully outside, its liberal democracy is under attack from within

CAS MUDDE 26 October 2015

Liberal democracy in Europe is under threat once more. This time, however, the threat comes from within the European elite. What can be done to remedy this situation?

 The key lesson from Syriza’s defeat? A different Europe requires both ideology and competence

CAS MUDDE 23 July 2015

To achieve anything in politics, including changing the rules, you have to master ‘the art of the possible,’ as conservative German statesman Otto von Bismarck famously said, rather than merely trumpet ‘the truth.’ 

 It’s time to end the Eurosceptic illusions

CAS MUDDE 13 July 2015

The EU is inherently a transnational neoliberal project. It is unrealistic to expect, and disingenuous to suggest, that it can be transformed into anything else.

 Why the new far-right political group in the European Parliament is a political failure

CAS MUDDE 16 June 2015

Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders announced the formation of the new Europe of Nations and Freedoms group in the European Parliament today. A financial success? Sure. A political success? Unlikely.

 Populism in Europe: a primer

CAS MUDDE 12 May 2015

EU President Herman van Rompuy has called populism "the greatest danger for Europe". But what exactly is populism? And why are EU leaders feeling so threatened by it?

 A Disunited Kingdom

CAS MUDDE 8 May 2015

While the Conservative victory is remarkable, it is a mere incident in the fundamental transformation of British politics that is being played out in at least four important chapters. British politics is dead.

 Populism and liberal democracy: is Greece the exception or the future of Europe?

CAS MUDDE and ANTONIS GALANOPOULOS 29 April 2015

Cas Mudde - one of the most distinguished scholars in the fields of the extreme right and populism - discusses far right and new left parties, with a special focus on Europe and Greece.

 What freedom of speech? Of foxes, chickens, and #JeSuisCharlie

CAS MUDDE 11 February 2015

Most Europeans, at both elite and mass level, have a grossly inflated idea of the extent of freedom of speech in Europe, a direct consequence of the uncritical and self-congratulatory discourse on the topic.

 After Syriza’s landslide: five predictions of a much similar future

CAS MUDDE 25 January 2015

In the end though, this will all probably lead mainly to more fragmentation, which will make fundamental change even more unlikely.

 No, we are NOT all Charlie (and that’s a problem)

CAS MUDDE 7 January 2015

It is comforting and politically expedient to claim that “we” are attacked because “they” cannot deal with “our” freedoms, particularly freedom of speech.

 Russia's Trojan Horse

CAS MUDDE 8 December 2014

Is the European far right really acting as Russia's Trojan Horse in the European Union? 

 The EAF is dead! Long live the MENL!

CAS MUDDE 12 October 2014

The Front National has long been at the centre of pan-European party initiatives, which were always dominated by former FN leader, Jean-Marie Le Pen. The EAF was founded without FN-involvement, however.

 Liberal democracy: the do’s and don’ts of banning political extremism

CAS MUDDE 11 August 2014

The most prominent case is the extreme right political party Golden Dawn in Greece. While all cases are different, they all address exactly the same fundamental question: what are the limits of political activism within a liberal democracy? 

 Electoral winners and political losers in the right-wing Eurosceptic camp

CAS MUDDE 11 June 2014

Could the political success of the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) in the aftermath of the 2014 European elections undermine Tory success in the 2015 British elections?

 Is Gerry Adams an Irish Nelson Mandela?

DONALD M. BEAUDETTE and CAS MUDDE 7 May 2014

Acknowledgments of culpability from leaders on both sides of the South African conflict to the vaunted Truth and Reconciliation Commission, were fundamental to helping the country move beyond its deeply divided past into a more peaceful future.

 The divided house of anti-Europe

CAS MUDDE 1 May 2014

Right-wing Eurosceptic parties will have more MEPs than ever before in the next European Parliament. But this doesn't mean they will be able to form a united Eurosceptic front.

 A new (order) Ukraine? Assessing the relevance of Ukraine’s far right in an EU perspective

CAS MUDDE 28 February 2014

Now that the EU is ready to embrace the new Ukrainian government, investing at least one billion euros in the ‘revolutionized’ country, it is time to reinvestigate the question of far right influence in Ukraine.

 Nothing left? In search of (a new) social democracy

CAS MUDDE 21 November 2013

(Real) social democracy is not just unknown to several generations of voters, but it is contradictory to their individualist or ethnicized worldview. So far the analyses and prospects do not look promising. 

 Is the revolution eating its children? The US Tea Party, between Astroturf and grassroots

CAS MUDDE 28 October 2013

The 2014 GOP primaries will show whether the Tea Party was indeed just an Astroturf invention, as many liberals have claimed, or a true grassroots movement, as most conservatives proclaim.

 The myth of Weimar Europe

CAS MUDDE 20 August 2013

Since the start of the Great Recession, it has become received wisdom that the far right is on the rise across Europe. But not often is the 'economic-crisis-breeds-extremism' thesis confronted with actual facts.

 The European elite's politics of fear

CAS MUDDE 18 March 2013

Fear mongering about 'anti-European populism' discredits the EU elite’s position on European democracy – it should stop.

 America's election and the Tea Party

CAS MUDDE 9 November 2012

A series of voting setbacks in November 2012 means the conservative Tea Party movement is now facing a difficult and divisive period, says Cas Mudde.

 Flemish nationalism: a new landscape

CAS MUDDE 15 October 2012

The results of Belgium's local elections has brought victory in the northern Flanders region to the conservative and nationalist but democratic New Flemish Alliance. This represents the transformation of Flemish nationalism, says Cas Mudde.

 The Dutch elections and the Eurosceptic paradox

CAS MUDDE 17 September 2012

Despite alarming predictions, last week's Dutch election results turned out to be anticlimactic, as voters placed their confidence in the two mainstream, moderate parties. But Brussels shouldn't celebrate too soon, as the "European weather vane" shows signs of bigger challenges to come.

 Dutch elections, European consequences

CAS MUDDE 12 September 2012

The combination of economic troubles and Eurosceptic pressures will increase the international impact of the Netherlands' latest election, says Cas Mudde.

 America’s new revolutionaries

CAS MUDDE 3 September 2012

The belief that the United States stands at a historic crossroads is widespread across the political spectrum. But among parts of the right the view takes worrying directions, says Cas Mudde.

 Norway’s democratic example

CAS MUDDE 28 August 2012

The process and result in the trial of Anders Breivik are a vindication of Norway’s liberal democracy and a lesson for the world, says Cas Mudde.

 Wisconsin's Sikh massacre: the real danger

CAS MUDDE 13 August 2012

The perpetrator of the latest mass shooting in the United States has been compared to Timothy McVeigh and Anders Breivik. But a closer understanding of his motives and actions is needed before making this connection, says Cas Mudde.

 Norway's atrocity: a story of non-impact

CAS MUDDE 20 April 2012

The immediate reactions to the terrorist attack in Oslo in July 2011 were both politicised and inaccurate. The opening of the perpetrator's trial nine months later finds leading ideological positions still full of evasion, says Cas Mudde.

 Europe: from crisis to opportunity

CAS MUDDE 8 December 2011

The origin of the eurozone crisis lies in the overreach of the Maastricht treaty of 1992. A new process is needed to set the European Union on a new course - but this must have explicit popular consent at its heart, says Cas Mudde.

 Europe's crisis and the radical right

CAS MUDDE 16 November 2011

The severe economic upheaval in Europe has not been matched by a political resurgence of the radical right. Cas Mudde asks why - and whether the dog could yet bark.

Occupy Wall Street: lessons and opportunities

CAS MUDDE 12 October 2011

The Occupy movement in the United States is both similar to and different from its Tea Party predecessor. The precise combination gives it political space to grow, says Cas Mudde.

 9/11: more security, less secure

CAS MUDDE 10 September 2011

The world has been changed by the securitisation of everyday life and the Islamisation of security. The accompanying threat-complex has shifted American sensibilities, says Cas Mudde. 

 Norway’s catastrophe: democracy beyond fear

CAS MUDDE 27 July 2011

The political response to atrocity often misjudges its character in ways that lead to further violations. This makes it all the more important that reaction to the bombing and massacre in Norway is based on careful assessment, says Cas Mudde.

 Geert Wilders and Dutch democracy

CAS MUDDE 24 June 2011

A court in the Netherlands has found the influential politician Geert Wilders innocent of charges of fomenting hatred and discrimination against Muslims. The decision is a challenge both to the rule of law and to Dutch politicians, says Cas Mudde. 

 European integration: after the fall

CAS MUDDE 24 May 2011

The financial crisis that has swept across European economies since 2008 is having profound political effects. It is time to face the new realities and discuss the options they present, says Cas Mudde.

CAS MUDDE 26 April 2011

In 2050, Europe has overcome the birth pains of multiculturalism and is accepting its diversity as a welcome given, rather than an imposed ideal or a frightening future. Open debate is finally embraced, and opponents are seen neither as criminals nor as enemies. Nothing is sacred, all is questioned, and former taboos like Islam or the royal family are discussed freely by both politicians and comedians.

https://opendemocracy.basecamphq.com/projects/3158271/file/77686136/chickenlovetolerance.jpg

 The new new radical right: spectre and reality

CAS MUDDE 20 April 2011

The emergence of a fresh current on Europe's political right, typified by figures such as Geert Wilders, is being widely discussed. But historically informed scrutiny suggests a different view, says Cas Mudde.

 The intolerance of the tolerant

CAS MUDDE 21 October 2010

The advance of populist anti-Islamic forces in the liberal bastions of northern Europe - Denmark, the Netherlands and Sweden - appears to reflect a betrayal of these societies’ renowned social tolerance. But there is a more subtle logic at work, says Cas Mudde.  

 The Geert Wilders enigma

CAS MUDDE 23 June 2010

The high-profile Dutch politician Geert Wilders is closer to mainstream centre-right politics in the Netherlands than his hardline rhetoric about Islam might suggest, says Cas Mudde.

 Neo-conservatism: Irving Kristol’s living legacy

CAS MUDDE 23 September 2009

The pioneer of one of the United States’s most potent intellectual-political currents has died. But it is far too early for an obituary of the neo-conservative movement or its ideas